Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Demet Cetiner · Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG · 2013
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
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Detailid
- Autor
- Demet Cetiner
- ISBN
- 9783642358210
- Aasta
- 2013
- Keel
- inglise
- Köide
- Pehme kaas
- Lehekülgi
- 168
- Teema
- Majandus, rahandus ja juhtimine › Äri ja juhtimine — Business & management
- Kaal
- 294 g