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Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Demet Cetiner · Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG · 2013

Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

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Detailid

ISBN
9783642358210
Aasta
2013
Keel
inglise
Köide
Pehme kaas
Lehekülgi
168
Teema
Majandus, rahandus ja juhtimine › Äri ja juhtimine — Business & management
Kaal
294 g